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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the ultimate facts of execution of the policy, loss within its cover-
age while the policy was in force, and general performance of all
conditions. This, if uncontested, would be sufficient to entitle in-
sured to payment under the policy and the right to maintain the
action. The insurer, should he wish to contest liability, would then
have the burden of pleading specifically any matter by reason of
which nonliability is asserted. This would be true whether the
matter relates to provisions denominated or interpreted as "con-
ditions," "exclusions" or "exceptions" of whatever kind. Once
specifically raised by the insurer, the insured would have the burden
of proving facts which show that his recovery should not be barred
by the allegations of the insurer, i.e., facts showing specific compli-
ance with the conditions raised by the insurer."s
CARL A. BARRINGTON, JR.
Master and Servant-Unfair Use of Customer Lists and Knowledge
In Henley Paper Co. v. McAllister,1 the plaintiff company sought
to enjoin a former salesman from working for a competitor, relying
upon an employment contract which contained a covenant not to
compete. The plaintiff was engaged in a highly competitive business
selling paper products and had hired the defendant as a salesman.
While working for the plaintiff, the defendant had compiled at his
own expense a record of sales and subsequently terminated his
service with the plaintiff to work for a competitor, using the record
of sales to solicit business for his new employer. The North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the provisions
of the covenant not to compete were unreasonable as to time and
geography and that the covenant lacked consideration. The view
has the burden of proof to deny it. Lee v. Chamblee, 223 N.C. 146, 25
S.E.2d 433 (1943); see also 1 McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 372 (2d ed. 1956).
" Under the rule submitted, which is quite similar to the New York
rule, there would be no problem with the definitional decision, as there would
be no categorizing of conditions as precedent or subsequent. Nor would the
insured, when his allegation of performance of all conditions precedent is met
by a general denial, be forced (as he presently is) to carry the burden of
proof blindly as to which conditions he must prove to satisfy the burden
of proof. The insurer is in a better position to know the policy and exactly
which facts or occurrences act as a bar to his liability. The more equitable
rule, therefore, would be to place the burden of pleading these facts or occur-
rences upon the insurer, and by so doing we enable the insured to know exactly
what he must prove to secure recovery.
1253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431 (1960).
19611
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
taken in this case seems to be consistent with prior North Carolina
decisions' on restrictive covenants which were deemed to be un-
reasonable.
Although the point was not expressly raised in the principal case,
the question arises whether a restraining order to prevent the de-
fendant from soliciting the plaintiff's customers while working for
a competitor would have been proper in the absence of a covenant
not to compete.8  This question does not appear to have been de-
cided in North Carolina, but other jurisdictions have protected the
former employer in this situation.4
Jurisdictions which have protected the former employer from
competitive solicitation by a former employee usually require a three-
fold showing by the plaintiff.5 First, he must show that knowledge
or a list of the names, addresses and requirements of customers
constitute a trade secret. Second, that the defendant, while in a
2 Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E.2d 121 (1947); Kadis v. Britt,
224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1943). See generally Note, Covenants Not To
Compete, 38 N.C.L. REV. 395 (1960).
'The scope of this note is confined solely to the fact situation where an
employee, while working for an employer, compiles a record of sales and
subsequently terminates his service with the employer to work for a com-
petitor or to start his own business, using the record of sales to solicit busi-
ness and to compete with the former employer. The question is not whether
the employer can prevent the employee from competing at all, but rather
whether the employer can prevent the employee from engaging in certain
competitive practices such as soliciting business from customers whose names
or addresses he acquired while employed by the former employer.
'See, e.g., George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 130 P.2d 399 (1942);
Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newbery, 3 N.Y. 2d 554, 147
N.E.2d 724 (1958). In these cases, two points of view have to be considered.
"The names of customers of a business concern, whose trade and patronage
have been secured by years of business effort and advertising, and the ex-
penditure of time and money, constituting a part of the good will of a busi-
ness which enterprise and foresight have built up, should be . .. entitled
to the same protection as the secret of compounding some article of manu-
facture and commerce. Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 334,
138 At. 47, 49 (1927); and equity will, to the greatest extent, protect the
property rights of employers in their trade secrets and otherwise. Alex
Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1955). But the rights and interests of the employee also have to be
considered. Sound public policy encourages employees to seek better jobs
from other employers and even to go into business for themselves. Haut v.
Rossbach, 128 N.J. Eq. 77, 15 A.2d 227 (Ct. Ch. 1940), aff'd, 128 N.J.
Eq. 478, 17 A.2d 165 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941). The employee should not be
deprived of the right to pursue a lawful and gainful occupation in a field for
which he is equipped. Levine v. E. A. Johnson & Co., 107 Cal. App. 2d 322,
237 P.2d 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).




position of trust and confidence with his employer, acquired such
knowledge or list. And third, that in violation of this trust and
confidence, the defendant is using this knowledge or list to the
injury and detriment of the former employer.
It is not a simple matter to determine what customer lists consti-
tute trade secrets. Where the very continuance of a business de-
pends upon keeping secret the names of customers,' and such secret
knowledge and lists are an important asset to the business,' then
such lists are species of property8 and are entitled to protection.
Knowledge of customers' addresses, buying habits, requirements and
preferences has been held to be confidential9 and a trade secret. 10
But where the names of customers are readily ascertainable and are
of a class known to the public in general, such as wholesale buyers
who are few in number 1 or persons listed in public directories or
trade publications,'" knowledge or a list of these customers is not a
trade secret.'3 A list of customers of a simple artless business is
not a trade secret,' 4 especially where the business relationship with
'George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153; 130 P.2d 399 (1942).
Brenner v. Stavinsky, 184 Okla. 509, 511, 88 P.2d 613, 615 (1939).
8 Ibid.9 Waliich v. Koren, 80 Cal. App. 2d 223, 181 P.2d 681 (Dist. Ct. App.
1947), holding that where the business is one of repeated purchases in prefer-
ence to the products of competitors, such knowledge of these customers is
"good will."
1" George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 160, 130 P.2d 399, 403 (1942). A
list of customers is a trade secret if the owner has confidential knowledge
concerning the value of such customers; Wallich v. Koren, supra note 9.
"
1Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
10 J. C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.
484, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; Gloria Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan, 2 Cal.
2d 460, 464, 41 P.2d 340, 342 (1935).
1" George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 159, 130 P.2d 399, 403 (1942).
" Abalene Exterminating Co. v. Elges, 137 N.J. Eq. 1, 3, 43 A.2d 165,
166 (Ct. Ch. 1945). Customers on a fuel oil delivery route are not trade
secrets. Vesuvius Fuel Oil Corp. v. Pirraglia, 128 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct.
1950) ; accord, as to laundry patrons. Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson,
140 Md. 359, 117 At. 753 (1922). However, the fact that patrons are listed
in the telephone directory but are otherwise unknown to the public generally
as business value does not prevent a customer list from being valuable.
George v. Burdusis, supra note 13. Confidential records of policy holders'
names, addresses and insurance data are trade secrets. Hoslinger, Theis &
Co. v. Holsinger, 329 Ill. App. 460, 471, 69 N.E.2d 360, 365 (1946) ; accord,
J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 113 P.2d 845 (1941).
Likewise, customer lists of persons without places of business which would
have been accessible to competitors only by investigation are trade secrets.
Nathan Outfitters, Inc. v. Pravder, 191 Misc. 726, 77 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). See for a contrary result concerning the names of general fire
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these customers is usually short in duration and often not renewed.'
The second showing that the plaintiff must make in order to
obtain relief is that the employee held a position of trust and confi-
dence when he obtained the information to be protected."6 The
plaintiff must also show that the employee has violated this trust
and confidence.' The former employee may seek the trade and
business of his old employer's customers by fair methods including
advertising,s but he may not canvass old customers whose identities
he learned in confidence and thereby destroy the good will of his
former employer.'" A salesman is privileged to advise the trade
that he has changed employment to the house of a rival employer2"
or that he has established his own business,2' as a notice of termina-
tion of employment is not considered solicitation.22 The former em-
ployee may solicit old customers to buy a new line of products which
are not handled by his old employer.13
The courts are almost unanimous in ruling, however, that a
former employee cannot use written lists,24 business records," or
insurance policy holders. Port Inv. Co. v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 163
Ore. 1, 94 P.2d 734 (1939).
"Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 205, 246 P.2d
11, 16 (1952).
" Though few cases have turned on or discussed this point at length,
the relationship is always evident. The American Law Institute takes
particular cognizance of this point, however: "The agent . . . has a duty
to the principal ... not to use or disclose ... trade secrets, written lists of
names, or other similar confidential matter given to him for the principal's
use or acquired by the agent in violation of duty...." RESTATEMENT
(Second), AGENCY § 396(b) (1958).
'Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955). The former employee's duty to the principal con-
tinues even after termination of employment. J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor
Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d 45, 53, 113 P.2d 845, 854 (1941).
" J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., supra note 17.
11 Ibid.
20 Wallich v. Koren, 80 Cal. App. 2d 223, 181 P.2d 682 (Dist. Ct. App.
1947).
" Aetna Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 203, 246 P.2d
11, 14 (1952).
" Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
" Ibid. Accord, where there is no evidence that the employee had a
plan or scheme to injure the former employer. Ice Delivery Co. v. Davis,
137 Wash. 649, 243 Pac. 842 (1926).
24 Brenner v. Stavinsky 184 Okla. 509, 510, 88 P.2d 613, 615 (1939).
"It is well settled in California that after an employee who worked on a
retail delivery route has left the service of his employer, his use of customer
lists to solicit for another person is an unwarranted disclosure of trade
secrets." George v. Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 159, 130 P.2d 399, 402 (1942).
A list of milk customers is confidential information and its use will be re-
[Vol. 40
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route books2" to competitively solicit old customers where their re-
quirements and identities are trade secrets and the employee came
by them in a position of trust. One reason that the courts will
readily restrain the use of written lists is based upon the theory that
the employer has a property right in written records" and if an
employee retains a list, he is carrying away something more than
mere experience gained in the business.2
Once the identity of the customers and their requirements are
classified as confidential and the employee has learned of them in
confidential service, many courts say that it makes no difference
that the employee retains and uses the list of customers on paper or
in his head.29 Most courts recognize the property rights in written
records, sometimes even where the names on them are not confi-
dential, and their language in prohibiting the use of written lists
appears to be more resolute and certain when they can rely on the
property theory.3 0 However, when courts have restrained a former
strained. Soeder v. Soeder, 82 Ohio App. 71, 77 N.E.2d 474 (1947). It
is not less confidential because a spy could discover the same. Colonial
Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 337, 138 Atl. 47, 49 (1927). The
prohibition against using written records also extends to those lists and
records which the employee surreptitiously copies or obtains during his
employment and subsequently uses. Brenner v. Stavinsky, supra.
" Jewel Tea Co. v. Grissom, 66 S.D. 146, 148, 279 N.W. 544, 545 (1938).
28 Santa Monica Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rossier, 42 Cal. App. 2d 467,
109 P.2d 382 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
" Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1955).
28 Di Angeles v. Scauzillo, 287 Mass. 291, 298, 191 N.E. 426, 429 (1934).
Solicitation will be restrained even where the lists are not confidential but
the employee carries out a preconceived plan to injure the plaintiff's business
by unfair competition. Gloria Ice Cream & Milk Co. v. Cowan, 2 Cal. 2d
460, 464, 41 P.2d 340, 342 (1935). Even where a salesman's contract pro-
vides for liquidated damages for failure to return secret lists, he is not
authorized to turn over these lists to a rival of his employer. Messenger
Pub. Co. v. Mokstad, 257 Ill. App. 161 (1930). The business competitor
who hires the employee will also be restrained from accepting business from
customers unfairly solicited by the former employee with the use of written
lists. George Burdusis, 21 Cal. 2d 153, 163, 130 P.2d 399, 404 (1942),
adding that the "employer should also be prohibited from obtaining the
benefit of such unfair practices to make the remedy effective and complete."
"
9Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290 P.2d 646
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955); J. L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Sec. Co., 9 Wash. 2d
45, 67, 113 P.2d 845, 855 (1941). There were no written lists in Colonial
Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 338, 138 AtI. 47, 49 (1927), but the
court stated that it could not see why the employer was entitled to less pro-
tection when the names on a list were carried off in the defendant's memory.
Contra, American Binder Co. v. Regal & Wade Mfg. Co., 278 App. Div.
431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1951).
"0 See discussion in notes 24 and 28 supra.
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employee from calling upon customers whom he remembers, the
courts tend to strictly construe the circumstances."'
As previously pointed out, North Carolina has never decided
whether equity will restrain a former employee from unfairly
soliciting old customers in the absence of a covenant not to compete.
But it should be noted that in Kadis v. Britt,3 2 the court cited with
approval a portion of the Restatement of Agency as follows:
The agent may use general information concerning the
business of the principal and the names retained in his mem-
ory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent ...
Thus while the agent cannot properly use written memoranda
concerning customers entrusted to him, or made by him for
use in connection with the principal's business, or copies
thereof . .. he is privileged to use in competition with the
principal the names retained in his memory as a result with
the principal and methods of doing business ... 2a
North Carolina has approved covenants not to compete. There-
fore, if the question is properly presented, it is submitted that
the North Carolina court should enjoin unfair competitive solicita-
tion by a former employee using written records in the absence of
any covenant not to compete.3 4 What limitation the court would
"As outlined in Alex Foods, Inc. v. Metcalfe, 137 Cal. App. 2d 415, 290
P.2d 646 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955), the plaintiff has to show that the em-
ployee acquired the secret knowledge of the customers during his employ-
ment, that this knowledge was not generally known to competitors, that these
customers were solicited with intent to injure the plaintiff's business and
that these customers whose trade was particularly profitable would usually
patronize only one business or concern and would continue to do so unless
unfairly hindered.
82224 N.C. 154, 162, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1944).
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 396 (1933). The court in Kadis v. Britt,
supra note 32, at 162, 29 S.E.2d at 548, also cited with approval a statement
from Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717,
132 N.Y. Supp. 37, 39 (1911), where a question of dealing with customers
arose but no lists were involved. The New York court stated: "All that clear-
ly appears is that he [the former employee] undertook to use in his new em-
ployment the knowledge he had acquired in the old. This, if it involves
no breach of confidence, is not unlawful; for equity has no power to compel
a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory."8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1960), provides that "no contract or agree-
ment hereafter made, limiting the rights of any person to do business any-
where in the State of North Carolina shall be enforceable unless such agree-
ment is in writing. . . ." It is submitted that this statute should have no
bearing on cases of this nature. As stated in Colonial Launderies, Inc. v.
Henry, 48 R.I. 332, 334, 138 At. 47, 48 (1927), "equitable jurisdiction ...
does not depend on such an express contract .... Specific performance of
[Vol. 40
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put on the definition of customer lists and knowledge as trade secrets
is unknown. A prior confidential relationship would probably be
required. If a narrow view of the dictum in the Kadis case is taken,
it may be indicative that North Carolina would be reluctant to
restrain competitive solicitation where the former employee relies
upon memory alone though the door is left open where the names
remembered were acquired and used in breach of trust. It should
be remembered that there is substantial case authority in other juris-
dictions approving the rule that lists remembered are likewise pro-
tectable.
DAVID M. CONNOR
Trusts-Rule Against Perpetuities-Class Gifts
In Parker v. Parker1 a testator devised certain property to his
son in trust, the rents and profits therefrom to be used for the edu-
cation of the son's children in such amounts as the trustee in his
discretion deemed necessary. The trustee was directed to convey
the property to the grandchildren (or grandchild) or to the issue
of any deceased grandchild "when" the youngest grandchild reached
twenty-eight. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
latter provision violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In North Carolina the Rule Against Perpetuities has been
stated as follows: "No devise or grant of a future interest in property
is valid unless title thereto must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-
one years, plus the period of gestation, after some life or lives in
being at the time of the creation of the interest."' The effect of the
a contract in its true sense is not sought. Prevention of unfair competition
is the reason for seeking equitable interference." This statute should be ap-
plicable only to express agreements between the parties, not to what the law
implicitly recognizes as unfair competition. The parties can agree to reason-
ably limit the employee from competing if such agreement is reduced to
writing and signed by the employee. But the master-servant or agency rela-
tionship found in the cases discussed does not limit the employee's right to
compete, but merely the methods that he may use.
1252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960).
Id. at 402, 113 S.E.2d at 902. The North Carolina court often has
incorrectly stated that the interest must vest in not less than twenty-one
years. This has not, however, affected any of the decisions. See Finch v.
Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957); McPherson v. First Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 80 S.E.2d 386 (1954); Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239
N.C. 370, 80 S.E.2d 18 (1954) ; McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952). The rule is properly stated in the
principal case and 'also in Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 116 S.E.2d 449
(1960).
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